Professor Hamlyn defen the idea of unconscious intentions independently of its place in Freudian theory. If successful, his argument would show that arguments such as Frederick Siegler's , would not succeed in demonstrating the incoherence of the Freudian notion of unconscious intention. Further, if Hamlyn is successful, he provides conceptual grounds from ordinary, non-psychoanalytic cases from which the Freudian notion of unconscious intention could be reconstructed.

Four groups of intentional action sentences can be distinguished. An intentional action sentence belongs in a given group as a consequence of the range of intentions, i.e. it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something in a particular manner, for a particular purpose, to a particular object, or it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something though he intends no particular manner or no manner at all (...) and intends no particular object. Thus the range of intention affects entailments, compatibility and inconsistency among intentional action sentences. A fragment of a theory of the range of intentions is set out and some of its implications are examined. (shrink)

Evidently wittgenstein claimed that it is a mistake to think that meaning something consists in anything. This claim is examined and several arguments for it are evaluated. I examine the less radical claim that meaning something does not consist in any one thing. Some parallels between semantic intention and actional intention are investigated. I argue that the first, Like the second, Are sometimes actual antecedents of thought and speech "and" action, Respectively. In such cases meaning something consists in thinking and (...) speaking with an intention. But what does "this" consist in? (shrink)

Arguments against naturalistic style accounts of representations in humans and other animals would be obviated if scepticism concerning their conclusion could be justified. One such justification consists in showing, in detail, that the concept of representation has a purchase among 'non-linguistic' animals. Thereby the existence of natural or 'intrinsic' intentionality is secured. Four levels of explanation can be distinguished in the study of animal behavior and capacity rely on attributions of representations to animals (to what N. Humphrey calls 'nature's psychologists'). (...) Such explanations cite factors which do not covary directly with physical magnitudes in the stimuli. Additional animal studies are analysed, examining (1) the claim that not all representations are 'linguistic' (the Two Representations Hypothesis), (2) categorization in animals, (3) 'self-representation' in animals, (4) animal deception, and (5) comparative and weighting representations in animal learning and behavior. (shrink)

Arguments against naturalistic style accounts of representations in humans and other animals would be obviated if scepticism concerning their conclusion could be justified. One such justification consists in showing, in detail, that the concept of representation has a purchase among 'non-linguistic' animals. Thereby the existence of natural or 'intrinsic' intentionality is secured. Four levels of explanation can be distinguished in the study of animal behavior and capacity rely on attributions of representations to animals (to what N. Humphrey calls 'nature's psychologists'). (...) Such explanations cite factors which do not covary directly with physical magnitudes in the stimuli. Additional animal studies are analysed, examining (1) the claim that not all representations are 'linguistic' (the Two Representations Hypothesis), (2) categorization in animals, (3) 'self-representation' in animals, (4) animal deception, and (5) comparative and weighting representations in animal learning and behavior. (shrink)